Software acquisition: procurement teams acquiring third-party software may find useful NIST's list of questions (PDF) to ask and security considerations relevant before, during and after procurement; e.g. some of those questions could be included in contractual warranties and/or due diligence questionnaires. See also CISA's related Software Acquisition Guide for Government Enterprise Consumers: Software Assurance in the Cyber-Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) Lifecycle (PDF, spreadsheet), again useful for private sector organisations too.
Personal data breaches/PDBs: an SA is not required to fine/enforce for a PDB if that's "not appropriate, necessary or proportionate to remedy the shortcoming found and to ensure that that regulation is fully enforced" (Case C‑768/21, TR v Land Hessen).
Revised EU Product Liability Directive: the new EU Parliament has approved the text (Eur-Lex), so it just remains for the Council to adopt it (although Estonia is against the procedural rules); when published in the OJ thereafter, it will become law. Significance? For the purposes of no-fault liability for defective products, "product" will explicitly include software including that supplied via SaaS. Note the emphasis on safety and cyber vulnerabilities.
Art.7(2): "In assessing the defectiveness of a product, all circumstances shall be taken into account, including... (f) relevant product safety requirements, including safety-relevant cybersecurity requirements..."
Also see the Recitals:"A product can also be found to be defective on account of its cybersecurity vulnerability, for example where the product does not fulfil safety-relevant cybersecurity requirements... relevant product safety requirements, including safety-relevant cybersecurity requirements, and interventions by competent authorities, such as issuing product recalls, or by economic operators themselves, should be taken into account in the assessment of defectiveness. Such interventions should, however, not in themselves create a presumption of defectiveness...The possibility for economic operators to avoid liability by proving that the defectiveness came into being after they placed the product on the market or put it into service should be restricted when a product’s defectiveness consists in the lack of software updates or upgrades necessary to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and maintain the safety of the product... manufacturers should also not be exempted from liability for damage caused by their defective products when the defectiveness results from their failure to supply the software security updates or upgrades that are necessary to address those products’ vulnerabilities in response to evolving cybersecurity risks [unless not in their control e.g. owner fails to install it; yet, no obligation under this law to provide updates/upgrades but see CRA below]... a third party exploiting a cybersecurity vulnerability of a product. In the interests of consumer protection, where a product is defective, for example due to a vulnerability that makes the product less safe than the public at large is entitled to expect, the liability of the economic operator should not be reduced or disallowed as a result of such acts or omissions by a third party. However, it should be possible to reduce or disallow the economic operator’s liability where injured persons themselves have negligently contributed to the cause of the damage, for example where the injured person negligently failed to install updates or upgrades provided by the economic operator that would have mitigated or avoided the damage."
EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) on "horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements": the new EU Parliament has approved the text (Eur-Lex), so it just remains for the Council to adopt it; when published in the OJ thereafter, it will become law. Note, this aims to "set the boundary conditions for the development of secure products with digital elements by ensuring that hardware and software products are placed on the market with fewer vulnerabilities and that manufacturers take security seriously throughout a product’s lifecycle".
EU DORA Regulation, financial entities: there are corrections in the versions for FR, RO, SL [sic, SI?]
UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill: while the UK recently designated data centres as Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), the CPNI list doesn't seem to have been updated accordingly yet. Note, this is not the same as extending the UK NIS Regulations to cover data centres (as the EU NIS2 Directive will do, though it's inapplicable in the UK post-Brexit). However, DSIT has indicated in its Sept newsletter (updated: now on gov.uk) that the Bill will strengthen UK’s cyber resilience and ensure the critical infrastructure and essential services are more secure, by "strengthening the UK’s only cross-sector cyber legislation – the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations 2018. Measures will include expanding the remit of the regulation to protect more digital services and supply chains". And just out: a DSIT webpage on this Bill. Currently it says little more about the Bill that what was in the King's Speech background PDF, but it does indicate that this Bill will be introduced to Parliament in 2025. (On ransomware under the Bill, please see below.)
Ransomware: in late 2023, Interpol and 50 countries including the UK signed a Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) joint statement on ransomware payments (US press release). The European Commission has now been authorised to negotiate, on behalf of the EU, the International Counter Ransomware Initiative 2024 Joint Statement (background on CRI). UPDATED: now see the full CRI guidance for organisations during ransomware incidents (news release).
(In May 2024, the UK NCSC with insurance industry bodies had issued Guidance for organisations considering payment in ransomware incidents, and the King's Speech detailed PDF in July 2024 stated that the forthcoming Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will be, among other things, "mandating increased incident reporting to give government better data on cyber attacks, including where a company has been held to ransom".)
UK communications providers & security: Ofcom updated its Network and Service Resilience Guidance for Communications Providers for telcos in early Sept 2024, following consultation. Ofcom said, "Specifically, we are making clear that we expect them to: ensure networks are designed to avoid or reduce single points of failure; make sure key infrastructure points have automatic failover functionality built in, so traffic is immediately diverted to another device or site when equipment fails; and set out the processes, tools and training that should be considered to support the requirements on resilience".
Proposed EU CSAM Regulation: the Global Encryption Coalition is concerned about the Hungarian Presidency's 9 Sept 2024 compromise text, which would still require scanning of encrypted messaging services, undermining encryption and accordingly security and privacy. The Presidency is pushing for a partial general approach at the Council by as soon as 10 Oct 2024! (Good encryption FAQ).
Passwords: NIST's latest draft Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management now states, among other things, that passwords:
- Minimum - "shall" be required to be 8 characters minimum, and "should" be required to be 15 characters minimum
- Maximum - "should" accept 64 characters (to enable passphrases)
- Types of characters - "should" accept ASCII, space, Unicode; but "shall" NOT require other composition rules like a mix of different character types - unlike what most organisations currently require!
- Change - "shall not" be required to be changed by users periodically (again unlike what too many organisations do), but change "shall" be required if there's evidence the "authenticator" was compromised (cf. that the password itself was compromised)
- No storage of password hints accessible to unauthenticated people (e.g. not logged in), and no prompts for knowledge-based authentication (like first pet's name) or security questions when choosing passwords
Payment webpages: fines have been imposed on companies under GDPR because their payment webpages got hacked, directly or indirectly, enabling criminals to capture customers' payment card details for fraud. The recent Frame Watch feature of ReportURI, helmed by noted security expert Scott Helme (if you'll forgive the pun!) alongside its existing Script Watch and Data Watch features, looks helpful to monitor and provide alerts for suspicious activity on payment pages.
Cloud forensics: post-data breach forensics on cloud services isn't easy. NIST's Cloud Computing Forensic Reference Architecture document, from July 2024, suggests ways to implement cloud architecture to faciliate forensics.
Aligning US federal agencies' cyber defence: CISA's priority areas aren't surprising: asset management, vulnerability management, defensible architecture, cyber supply chain risk management, and incident detection and response. The tricky bit is, of course, aligning systems/processes accordingly, e.g. by increasing operational visibility of assets, managing the attack surface of Internet-accessible assets, securing cloud applications etc., under its Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Operational Cybersecurity Alignment (FOCAL) Plan. Again, much of this is of use to the private sector too.
Also of interest:
- The recently-published UK MoD's annual analysis of future global strategic trends 2024 mentions cyber and AI, unsurprisingly
- NIST on Building a Cybersecurity and Privacy Learning Program
- US proposed rule intended "to Secure Connected Vehicle Supply Chains from Foreign Adversary Threats"
- US White House report, Roadmap to Enhancing Internet Routing Security
- Many countries' agencies' Guidance on Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises (news release)
- Initiatives on closing the cyber skills gap (what about encouraging career changers, part-timers, retired people etc., not just incentivising teens/younger people into cyber careers?)
- UK NCSC on software bills of materials (SBOM)
- Dissection of exactly what went wrong leading to the 2023 UK emergency services outage - this sort of detailed sequencing of events, root causes etc. is always helpful for others to learn from
- Microsoft's Secure Future Initiative (for secure by design, secure by default, secure operations) - progress update and Sept 2024 report, initiated after attacks like the well-known successful attacks on Exchange for email. The SFI's 6 key pillars represent security 101 for all: protect identities and secrets, protect tenants and isolate production systems, protect networks, protect engineering systems, monitor and detect threats, accelerate response and remediation
- ADDED Cloud is now quite mainstream, but the cloud adoption checklist in US CISA's Considerations for Public Safety Cloud Computing Adoption from Jul 24 is generally useful for all organisations, even those not in public safety, and covers much more than just security issues
- ADDED Hybrid cloud risks: Microsoft has noted threat actor Storm-0501 compromising on-prem environments then moving laterally "from on-premises to cloud environment, leading to data exfiltration, credential theft, tampering, persistent backdoor access, and ransomware deployment", targeting many US public and private sector organisations
- ADDED ENISA Threat Landscape 2024 identifies 7 prime cybersecurity threats, topped by threats against availability, then ransomware and threats against data, and analyses many publicly-reported incidents
- ADDED Canada: if attacker accesses and encrypts data without exfiltration e.g. for ransom purposes, that is still considered a breach that must be notified to affected individuals under Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA), and the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).
- ADDED NIS2 Directive, very little time left before it's fully applicable! - draft national law implementations include:
- Ireland's National Cyber Security Bill 2024 (from 30 Aug 24)
- Italy